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Cross-world identity, philosophy: is an expression for the problem of how to determine the identity of an object by accepting properties that it does not have in the actual world. Is it meaningful to say that Paul could have been taller in a possible world than he actually is, or would Paul be another individual then? See also possible worlds, modal realism, counterpart theory, counterpart relation, counterparts, telescope theory, centered worlds._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Cross World Identity - Dictionary of Arguments
II 158f The identification between possible worlds depends on the predicates. For bodies the identification also depends on space location, composition etc. Therefore it is not a "cross world". "The same object" is meaningless. We need singular terms instead of predicates. II 149 Possible World/Quine: a possible world is a vivid way, to assert an essentialist philosophy. In order to identify the subject in a world, essential properties are needed. >Possible World/Quine. Hintikka I 137 QuineVsModal Logic: there is the problem of Cross Word Identification. Cross World Identification/Quine/(s): Problem of identity conditions. If there are no identity conditions, there is no point in asking whether an individual is "the same as" one in another possible world. HintikkaVsQuine: my modified approach goes beyond the scope of Quine's criticism. World lines/Hintikka: are fixed by us, not by God. Yet they are not arbitrary. Their limitations are given by continuity of space and time, memory, localization, etc. I 138 It may even be that our presuppositions turn out to be wrong. Therefore, there can be no set of world lines covering all possible worlds that we need in the Alethic modal logic. Modal Logic/Quantification/Quine/Hintikka: a realistic interpretation of the quantified Alethic Modal Logic is impossible. But for reasons deeper than Quine assumed. Cross World Identification/HintikkaVsQuine: cross world identification is not intrinsically impossible. Quine/Hintikka: has recently even acknowledged this with restrictions. Solution/Hintikka: to see Cross World Identification as re-identification._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |